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Abstract 
 
Background There has been recent interest in using the DCE method to derive health 
state utilities for use in QALY calculations but challenges remain. Objectives We set 
out to develop a risk-based DCE approach to derive utility values for health states that 
allowed; a) utility values to be anchored directly to normal health and death and b) 
worse than dead health states to be assessed in the same manner as better than dead 
states.  Further, we set out to estimate alternative models of risky choice within a 
DCE model.  Method A survey was designed that incorporated a risk-based DCE and 
a ‘modified’ SG.  Health state utility values were elicited for three EQ-5D health 
states assuming ‘standard’ EU preferences. The DCE model was then generalised to 
allow for Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDU) preferences thereby allowing for 
probability weighting.  A convenience sample of 60 students was recruited and data 
collected in small groups.  Results Under the assumption of ‘standard’ EU 
preferences, the utility values derived within the DCE corresponded fairly closely to 
the mean results from the modified SG.  Under the assumption of RDU preferences, 
the utility values estimated are somewhat lower than under the assumption of standard 
EU, suggesting that the latter may be biased upwards. Conclusion  Applying the 
correct model of risky choice is important whether a modified SG or a risk-based 
DCE is deployed.  It is, however, possible to estimate a probability weighting 
function within a DCE and estimate ‘unbiased’ utility values directly which is not 
possible within a modified SG.  We conclude by setting out the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the two approaches in this context.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) allow a number of characteristics to be traded off 
against one another and are becoming increasingly popular in health economics. 
Although the origins of the DCE approach lie in marketing, they were later applied to 
the valuation of aspects of health care not easily captured using conventional Quality 
of life measures, such as the type of services received1,2. There has, however, been 
recent interest in using the DCE method to derive health state utilities for use in 
QALY calculations and there remains uncertainty about how that is best done 3. This 
paper adds to the small literature on how utility values for health may be derived 
directly within a DCE. 
 
The motivation for the use of DCEs to elicit utility values has been linked to well- 
known problems that exist with more traditional value elicitation techniques such as 
Standard Gamble (SG) and Time Trade Off (TTO) 3-7. For example, the SG has been 
criticized on the basis that Expected Utility (EU) is not a descriptively valid theory of 
decision making under risk 7. Furthermore techniques (such as SG and TTO) that set 
out to elicit an individual’s point of indifference are regarded as more cognitively 
demanding than those involving pair-wise choices 5,6.  
 
There are a number of methodological challenges, however, to be addressed in 
deriving health state utility values in particular within a DCE. In more traditional 
applications of DCEs attributes can reasonably be assumed to contribute to utility in 
an additive way, albeit with the possibility of interaction effects between attributes.  
The inclusion of attributes such as risk 7 in a DCE, presents different challenges than 
have traditionally arisen in terms of the appropriate functional form of the model. 
Risk has to enter the model in a multiplicative, rather than additive, manner as there is 
no meaningful preference over ‘risk’, independent of what that risk is of.  
 
Estimating utility values for health states within a DCE requires health states to be 
anchored to normal health (generally assigned a value of ‘1’) and dead (generally 
assigned a value of ‘zero’).  There are DCE studies that look at comparison of health 
states, without trying to link them to a normal health/dead scale8, but the results 
cannot then be used as utility values and incorporated into QALY calculations.  Other 
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researchers have tried to link DCE valuations to normal health and death by asking 
one or more SG or TTO questions alongside the DCE 3.  If DCE is being applied in 
order to overcome perceived problems with SG and TTO, then using those methods to 
anchor valuations is clearly problematic.  
 
Recent studies have used a ‘TTO-like’ format and have linked health states to normal 
health and dead within a DCE by either including ‘dead’ as a state or survival 
duration as an attribute9,10. The approach, termed DCETTO, includes health states and 
survival duration (not including zero) as attributes, but does not include immediate 
death as an option. Bansback and colleagues use this approach to value a range of 
EQ-5D states9.  In the DCETTO, normal health is set at one and values worse than dead 
can be inferred indirectly at a sample level, by using the coefficients on attribute 
levels as incremental reductions in quality of life. Thus, setting normal health equal to 
1 and subtracting incremental decreases in quality of life associated with attribute 
levels, there will come a point when the values lie below zero.  Values inferred less 
than zero are then taken to signify that the state is worse than dead. One possible 
drawback with this approach is that respondents are never asked to consider death 
directly. 	
 
Another way in which utility values may be linked directly to death within a DCE is 
to include some risk of immediate death as an option. One advantage of using risky 
choices is that there is a body of research looking at decision making under risk11,12 
and there has been some success in adjusting for biases in risky choices13,14. Whilst 
traditional SG approaches generally involve the certainty of the ‘target’ health state, 
we follow Carthy et al15 in using the term ‘modified’ SG here to denote that risk 
appears in both options (the approach is referred to elsewhere as the ‘lottery 
equivalent’ approach16,17).  
 
If we are to use risk-based DCE, it is important to consider how the theory of random 
utility might be adapted to incorporate recent advances in decision-making under risk. 
The random utility theory of McFadden underpins the analysis of DCEs 18.  It models 
decision making as a stochastic process around expected utility. There are, however, a 
number of other models of decision making under risk. For example, Rank Dependent 
Expected Utility (RDU) assumes that people over- or under-weight probability and so 
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it incorporates a probability weighting function in its specification of decision making 
19,20. Cumulative Prospect Theory subsumes RDU as it incorporates a probability 
weighting function and also allows for people to experience greater changes in utility 
from losses compared to gains21.  
 
It has been argued previously that random utility theory can incorporate a broad range 
of preference models that can be estimated using discrete choice experiments22. One 
important paper considered the use of rank dependent expected utility functions in 
DCE in looking at treatments and side-effects of Crohn’s disease7. The authors found 
evidence of non-linearity in how risks were perceived and derived lower utility values 
under assumptions of RDU than ‘standard’ EU (henceforth we use simply ‘EU’ to 
denote ‘standard EU’). This led them to argue that traditional SG methods assuming 
EU are biased but stressed that it was difficult to do a direct comparison as the nature 
of the risks included in their DCE was very different to those commonly used in SG7.  
 
One criticism of traditional value elicitation techniques, such as SG and TTO is that 
the procedures for valuing states worse than dead involve a fundamental departure 
from those used to value better than dead states. Given the  large body of evidence 
showing that responses can be affected by descriptive and procedural invariance23 we 
argued previously that such evidence must call into question the validity of 
aggregating better than and worse than dead scores generated by two different 
procedures24. It can be shown, however, that a technique which presents respondents 
with choices over two risky treatments allows states worse than dead to be valued in 
the same manner as better than dead states. One such method is the ‘modified’ SG 
which also avoids any ‘certainty effect’ bias uncovered elsewhere 25-27 as it 
incorporates risk on both sides. This approach has been used successfully 
previously15-17,28. 
 
We set out here to develop a method whereby utility values may be derived within a 
DCE that anchors them directly to normal health and death. Further, we set out to 
allow worse than dead health states to be derived in the same manner as better than 
dead states. Whilst the nature of the risk attribute used in a previous risk-based DCE 
study was such that direct comparisons with SG were problematic7, we set out here to 
make the methods as comparable as possible. 
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The aims of this research are therefore: 
 
1) To develop a method for eliciting values for health states, anchored to normal 
health and dead, within a risk-based DCE. 
2) To develop a framework in which values for ‘better than dead’ and ‘worse 
than dead’ health states can be elicited in the same manner.   
3) To compare EU and RDU models of risky choice within a DCE.  
4) To compare the results of the DCE model(s) with the modified SG. 
 
2. METHODS 
 
2.1  Overview of the survey  
There were 60 participants recruited from the population of second and third year 
students studying Economics or Geography at the Universities of London (Queen 
Mary) and Exeter in 2011/12.  Data were collected by means of small groups 
comprising on average between 8 and 9 participants which were convened by two 
authors (AS and AR). Respondents were invited to take part either through e-mail (at 
Queen Mary) or through the experimental laboratory (FEELE at Exeter University) 
and were each paid £10.  The study was granted local ethical approval in both 
institutions. 
  
The groups began with a brief introduction to the aims of the study and the the EQ-5D 
health states (21121, 22222 and 22323). Respondents were first asked to rank the 
health states along with normal health (11111) and ‘immediate death’.  This was 
followed by DCE questions (15) and modified SG questions (3). The order in which 
the DCE and modified SG questions appeared was randomised. Finally respondents 
answered a series of 4 questions designed to elicit risk attitudes using money lotteries.  
 
2.2 The DCE questions  
In the DCE exercise, respondents were presented with two risky treatments, labeled A 
and B.  All risky treatments involved some chance p of an outcome (21121, 22222, 
22323, or immediate death) and an associated chance, 1-p, of normal health (11111). 
A typical question is shown in Figure 1 and used graphical displays to illustrate risk 
information. In this case, Treatment A offers a 10% chance of normal health and a 
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corresponding 90% chance of health state 21121. Treatment B offers a 99% chance of 
normal health and 1% chance of immediate death. We simplify this notation 
henceforth as Treatment A offers a 90% chance of 21121 and Treatment B offers a 
1% chance of death. It is important to remember, however, that there is always an 
associated chance of normal health as normal health appeared in all treatments. In this 
example and at the point of indifference, the calculation (under EU) is: 0.9 (U21121) + 
0.1(U11111) = 0.01 (Udead) + 0.99(U11111) and assigning values of 0 and 1 to dead and 
normal health respectively and rearranging gives: 0.9 (U21121) = 0.89, so U21121 = 
0.988 
 
Respondents were asked to suppose that they had some condition and they were faced 
with two different treatments for that condition. They were asked to tick one of three 
possible responses, namely: prefer A; equally preferable, prefer B.  We elected to 
include the ‘indifference’ option in the choice data as we wanted to maximize the 
similarities across the DCE and modified SG approaches. This avoids ‘forcing’ a 
preference which may not always be appropriate29.    
 
Whilst we have used the EQ-5D descriptive system for convenience, it is important to 
stress here that we are not setting out here to derive a set of weights for that system.  
As developing a methodology is our aim here, we opted for a very simple design 
involving only two attributes- outcome and risk. The DCE questions varied on one or 
more of the two attributes shown below: 
 
 The outcome (health states 21121, 22222, 22323 or immediate death) coloured 
yellow, green, grey and blue respectively. 
 The probability of that outcome (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 70%, 
90%).   
 
The attributes and levels set in this study produced a total of 630 different 
combinations (as there are 9×1×4=36 scenarios and the number of ways of choosing 
r=2 scenarios at random from n=36 is (n)!/(n-r)!r!=36.35/2=630). We chose to include 
all non-dominated combinations in this exploratory study. This was due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the optimal design for multiplicative models 30 and to avoid 
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limiting the scope of the analysis unnecessarily by using a fractional factorial 
design29.  
 
There were three types of dominance that arose in the study due to the levels of risk, 
health states or both.  Choices could be ‘risk-dominated’ in that they involved the 
same health state but a different level of risk attached to that state.  We elected to ask 
all participants (a different) one of the 144 ‘risk-dominated’ questions contained in 
the full factorial, as a simple test of consistency, and so included 60 risk-dominated 
choices. As there is a ‘logical’ ordering of health states in that 
21121 22222 22323, choices could be ‘state-dominated’ in that they involved the 
same level of risk but a better/worse health state. The full factorial contained a total of 
27 such choices which we randomly allocated. Finally, choices could be ‘risk/state 
dominated’ in that they involved a lower risk of a less severe state. For example, 
suppose that Treatment A offered a 30% chance of health state 21121 (and associated 
70% chance of normal health) and Treatment B offered a 40% chance of 22222 (and 
associated 60% chance of normal health). Treatment A clearly dominates Treatment 
B, as is offers a lower risk of less severe illness.  The full factorial contained a total of 
108 such comparisons which we retained and which were randomly allocated. In total 
our design included 546 choices (630-144=546): 351 non-dominated and 195 
dominated choices that we elected to retain (60+27+108=195).  
 
Respondents were presented with a set of 15 DCE questions.  The first question was 
one drawn randomly from the 144 ‘risk dominated’ comparisons described above. 
Each respondent was presented with a further 8 questions drawn randomly from the 
full factorial design.  In addition, respondents were presented with a common set of 6 
questions that were interspersed with those randomly allocated. The 6 ‘common’ 
questions were a series that set out to allow the utility value of one health state- 
22222- to be determined at the level of the individual respondent.  These questions are 
not the focus of the current paper.  
 
2.3 The modified SG 
In the modified SG part of the questionnaire, the framing of the question was 
designed to closely resemble the pair-wise choices that appeared in the DCE.  Rather 
than having the risks associated with both treatments fixed in advance and being 
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asked to choose between treatments, only one treatment was fixed in the modified SG. 
Respondents were presented with a fixed risk of the health state under Treatment A, 
and then asked to ‘set’ that risk of death in Treatment B that made them indifferent 
between the two treatments. Participants were asked three modified SG questions.  
For health states 21121 and 22222, Treatment A involved a 90% risk of that state. For 
health state 22323, Treatment A involved a 20% risk of that health state, to allow for 
potentially lower values. The modified SG questions were asked in a fixed order 
21121, 22222 and then 22323. Groups were randomized to see DCE or modified SG 
first.  
 
Utility values are then estimated directly from the modified SG in exactly the same 
way as set out above. Considering the choice set out in Figure 2, suppose the 
respondent sets the indifference probability of dead at 0.20, then under EU : 
0.90 (U22222) + 0.10(U11111) = 0.20 (Udead) + 0.80(U11111) and assigning values of 1 and 
0 to full health and dead respectively gives: (U22222) = 0.78.   
     
The format of both the modified SG and DCE questions allow worse than dead states 
to be valued in exactly the same manner as better than dead states. For example, 
suppose the modified SG question involved a 20% risk of EQ-5D health state 22323 
under Treatment A, and the respondent set the risk of death under Treatment B at 
40%.  Then 0.2 (U22323) + 0.8(U11111) = 0.40 (Udead) + 0.60(U11111) and assigning value 
of 1 and 0 to normal health and dead respectively gives: (U22323)= -1. In effect, health 
state 22323 is worse than dead, provided that respondents prefer to take a higher risk 
of death to avoid the risk of health state 22323. 
 
In the final part of the questionnaire, four questions were used to elicit participants’ 
risk attitudes for monetary lotteries, using the mid-weight method proposed by Kuilen 
and Wakker31. These questions are not the focus of the current paper, but details are 
available from the authors on request. 
 
2.4 Modelling the DCE Choices  
The estimation strategy is discussed in detail in the appendix: we provide a non-
technical summary here. Recall that respondents were presented with two risky 
treatments, labeled A and B.  All risky treatments involved some chance p of an 
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outcome (21121, 22222, 22323, or immediate death) and an associated chance, 1-p, of 
normal health (11111). They were asked to tick one of three possible responses, 
namely: prefer A; equally preferable, prefer B.  Briefly, we used an ordered probit 
model to assess the likelihood of each response based on the difference in the 
expected utility of treatments A and B (the EU model).  We consider both EU and 
RDU preferences, the latter allowing for non-linear weighting of probabilities.  In the 
RDU model, rather than calculate the expected utility of treatments A and B, we first 
apply a transformation mechanism to the probabilities in the form of a power 
weighting function  r r    where r is the probability of the good outcome (in this 
particular case equal to 1-p).  This weighting function implies that the probability of 
the good outcome, when strictly between 0 and 1, is either always over-weighted (if 
<1) or always underweighted (if >1).  A strictly convex weighting function has been 
estimated previously 32.   
 
The parameters of central interest are the utilities of the three health states 21121, 
22222 and 22323, denoted by u1, u2  and u3 respectively.  
 
The parameter  is known as the “cut-point”, and indicates the distance from perfect 
indifference a subject must be to indicate a clear preference between the two 
alternatives (closer to indifference, ‘equally preferable’ is reported).  
 
There is a further way in which we generalize the econometric model. The model 
contains a parameter  which represents computational error by the respondent in 
computing the valuation difference for a given problem.   We first estimate the models 
assuming that this parameter takes the same value for all problems.  We then relax 
this assumption by allowing  to differ between different problem types as it seems 
plausible that errors are more likely with some problem types than others. The 
inclusion of ‘dominated’ options may influence this as may the inclusion of choices 
involving ‘immediate death’ which may well be perceived very differently than those 
involving two health states. Therefore, we allowed three different error variance 
parameters: dominance for “dominance” problems; death for problems involving 
‘immediate death’ as one of the outcomes and standard for “standard” problems (i.e. 
non dominance problems not involving immediate death).		
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Estimation of utility values from the modified SG questions 
Recall that in the modified  SG questions respondents were presented with a fixed risk 
of a health state under Treatment A, but then asked to ‘set’ that risk of death in 
Treatment B that made them indifferent between the two treatments.  Using the EU 
calculations set out in the methods section above, the utility value of the health states 
can be calculated for each individual.  Table 1 presents mean and median utility 
values for the 3 health states from the modified SG assuming standard EU preferences 
as is traditional. Of course, if the EU model is not correct and respondents were 
under-weighting probabilities, then the modified SG results will over-estimate the 
utility values.  We return to this in the discussion.  
 
 
3.2 Estimation of utility values within the DCE model 
The results of the DCE models are presented in Table 2 which shows the results under 
both EU and RDU, with both the fixed error and varying error specifications.   
 
The parameter estimates of primary interest are the three utilities. Firstly note that the 
utility estimates obtained under the assumption of EU ( fixed) are fairly close to the 
corresponding mean utility values from the modified SG presented in Table 1, 
indicating a degree of consistency across methods. Note also that utility values 
estimated under the assumption of RDU are somewhat lower than under the 
assumption of standard EU, indicating that the latter may be biased upwards. Recall 
that the power weighting function implies that the probability of the good outcome, 
when strictly between 0 and 1, is either always over-weighted (if <1) or always 
underweighted (if >1).  The latter turns out to be the case for this data set, a situation 
sometimes referred to as strictly convex weighting.  The estimate the power-
weighting parameter  (taken from the final column of results) is 3.747 and the 
implied weighting function is shown in Figure 3, together with the 450-line which is 
implied under EU.  It is clear that the probability of normal health is seriously under-
weighted, particularly when the true probability is small.  
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It must be recognised that the weighting function depicted in Figure 3 does not 
capture the “inverse-S” shape that has become standard in the modelling of choices 
over money gambles.  However, when the inverse-S function of Tversky and 
Kahneman	21 is applied to this problem, the fixed point (where the weighting function 
crosses the 450-line) is found to be very close to the origin, and consequently the 
function is not dissimilar to the power function with >1.  Systematic under-weighting	
of	probabilities	has	been	found	in	different	contexts	previously	32,33. It is 
important to note that, if utilities derived under standard EU assumptions are biased 
upwards, that will hold for the modified SG results also.  
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 present the results of the models in which the 
variance parameter is assumed to vary between problem types.  Firstly, note that on 
the evidence of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) which is reported in the final 
row, this assumption results in a considerable improvement in statistical fit even 
allowing for the presence of additional parameters. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
dominance problems have the smallest estimated variance. Problems involving death 
have the highest estimated variance and we return to this in the discussion.  
 
We conclude by reporting that only 2 (of 60) respondents failed any of the dominance 
tests, although it is not too surprising that a sample of students (many of whom had 
studied economics) would pass such tests.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
We report the results of an exploratory study that set out to develop a risk-based DCE 
to derive utility values for health states and to compare the results with those from a 
modified SG. Both methods allow health states to be anchored to normal health and 
death, allowing utility values to be derived directly using either method. Further, both 
the modified SG and risk-based DCE deployed here allowed worse than dead states to 
be valued in the same manner as better than dead states. Our results show a broad 
correspondence between the results from DCE model and the mean modified SG 
results, particularly under the assumption of EU preferences.  The results are very 
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similar indeed for two of the health states (21121 and 22222) whilst the DCE model 
results are higher than modified SG for 22323. Of course, demonstrating 
correspondence between the results does not, in itself, allow anything to be concluded 
about the relative merits of the different approaches.   
 
It is widely considered that SG values ought to be corrected for probability-weighting 
if utilities are not to be biased upwards14. It is clear from our results that the same is 
true for utilities derived within a DCE and we have demonstrated how utility values 
may be adjusted for probability weighting directly in a DCE. Our findings are 
consistent with those of other studies that have shown consistent underweighting of 
probability both in the area of health33 and	other	risky	choices31.		
	
Whilst it is possible to adjust modified SG values to allow for probability weighting, 
this would rely on using a probability-weighting function derived elsewhere. This 
obviously begs the question of where such a probability-weighting function would 
come from. Although not a prominent part of this paper, we did explore the use of 
risk attitude money lottery questions that would potentially allow a within-sample 
probability weighting factor to be derived and used to adjust SG valuations31. An 
obvious methodological issue there would be whether risk attitudes in the domain of 
money lotteries would necessarily be the same as those in health34.  In addition, the 
feasibility of asking the required number of money lottery questions alongside the SG 
method would have to be established. It does appear, therefore, that a DCE 
incorporating an appropriately specified model of risky choice offers the more 
promising means of deriving ‘unbiased’ utility values in this context.  
 
We found an improvement in statistical fit of the DCE model in allowing the error 
variance to differ between different problem types.  Problems involving death were 
found to have the highest estimated error variance, which may indicate that those 
questions were more difficult for respondents. The conceptual problems of including 
‘dead’ as a health state in a DCE have been outlined previously30, but utility values 
have to be anchored to 1 and 0 somehow.  Whilst we have demonstrated a framework 
for anchoring utility values directly to normal health and dead – and of valuing better 
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and worse than dead states using exactly the same procedure – it is clear that there 
remain challenges in incorporating death directly into a DCE.  
 
We conclude by making some more general points about the assessment of the 
relative merits of DCE and more traditional methods such as SG and TTO.  Methods 
such as SG and TTO are traditionally thought of as ‘matching’ techniques – whereby 
the task is to ‘set’ the level of risk/duration that makes the respondent indifferent 
between two options.  There is a literature on the fact that ‘matching’ and ‘choice’ 
tasks maybe tapping into different cognitive processes and, hence, the results are 
likely to differ across methods.  One criticism of ‘matching’ tasks is that, in asking 
respondents to ‘match’ on any single dimension encourages respondents to attach 
undue weight to that specific dimension while neglecting other factors that they 
would otherwise wish to be taken into consideration23.   
 
Whilst the modified SG that respondents completed here was an actual  ‘matching’ 
task (in that we asked respondents to directly ‘set’ the probability of death in 
Treatment B to make them indifferent between A and B), it is important to 
acknowledge that most SG and TTO elicitation techniques actually present 
respondents with a series of pair-wise choices.  Holding the format of the questions 
the same, the only difference between SG (or TTO) and a DCE is that in the former 
the choices are generally generated by an interactive process that tries to ‘hone in’ on 
that respondents point of indifference. When considered in this way, the SG (and 
TTO) could be seen as more ‘efficient’ techniques at arriving at utility values than 
DCE.  On the other hand, a possible drawback of any interactive approach is that 
‘starting point’ biases and anchoring effects may be introduced that are avoided in the 
DCE.   
 
It is not possible to choose between the methods on the basis of the current study.  As 
there was a logical ordering of the three EQ 5D states used here, the ranking data 
offers little by way of ‘validating’ the findings-although this could offer a useful 
check in future studies. We cannot offer an assessment of whether the modified SG or 
DCE incorporating risky choices is ‘superior’, but we can go some way towards 
setting out the potential strengths and weaknesses in this context. Setting out valid 
arguments is a small, but important, step as we believe certain arguments that have 
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been put forward previously are not valid.  For example, arguing that methods such as 
SG (and TTO) that set out to ‘hone in’ on a point of indifference- i.e. where it is 
hardest to choose between options -are ‘harder’ for respondents to do than DCE 6 is 
somewhat spurious.  After valid arguments have been set out, the choice between 
methods may ultimately depend on the relative weights attached to the various criteria 
and how they are traded-off against one another.  For example, if it is of primary 
importance to investigate utility values at the level of the individual, then SG may be 
favoured over DCE.  On the other hand, having a relatively simple means of adjusting 
aggregate values to allow for probability may be considered of more importance, in 
which case the DCE will be favoured. We present a summary of the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the two methods of deriving utility values in Table 3 below.  
Additional considerations would be the ability to value ‘process’ factors alongside 
health outcomes (which would favour DCE 35) and resource efficiency in terms of the 
sample size requirements, but these issues are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
An obvious limitation of the study is that we used a convenience sample of students 
and it remains to be seen how members of the public would cope with the exercises. 
We only derived valuations for three EQ 5D health states, but the method could be 
expanded in order to allow	for	the	valuation	of	attribute	levels	and	a	‘tariff’	to	be	
estimated.			
	
We believe the body of work currently being undertaken to estimate utility values 
within a DCE is important and that the method does have the potential to replace 
traditional methods such as SG and TTO.  We believe we have gone some way 
towards setting out the methodological issues that remain and in clarifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of DCE compared to more traditional methods.  
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Table 1 Mean, median and standard deviation of utility values from modified SG 
 EQ -5D 
state 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
SD  
 
21121 0.899 0.944 0.130 
22222 0.816 0.899 0.168 
22323 0.214 0.500 0.716 
 
	 2
 
Table 2  Estimates of coefficients (asy. st. errors) from DCE models  
 
 EU ( fixed) RD( fixed) EU ( varying) RD( varying) 
u1 (21121)  0.907(0.030) 0.817(0.041) 0.882(0.018) 0.799(0.031) 
u2 (22222) 0.789(0.015) 0.592(0.043) 0.786(0.015) 0.621(0.038) 
u3 (22323) 0.284(0.050) 0.169(0.049) 0.336(0.052) 0.245(0.051) 
     
 0.154(0.010) 0.276(0.022)   
standard   0.106(0.019) 0.193(0.036) 
dominance   0.042(0.008) 0.107(0.021) 
death   0.163(0.011) 0.289(0.025) 
     
     
  4.253(0.829)  3.747(0.689) 
 0.031(0.003) 0.059(0.007) 0.025(0.003) 0.052(0.007) 
     
N 900 900 900 900 
K 5 6 7 8 
LogL -613.53 -582.88 -595.07 -568.20 
AIC (2k-2LogL) 1237.06 1177.76 1204.14 1152.4 
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Table 3 Summary of the relative strengths and weaknesses of DCE and modified SG   
Advantage Modified SG Risk-based DCE 
Allows health states to be anchored directly to 
normal health and death 
  
Allows WTD and BTD states to be assessed on 
the same scale 
  
Individual-level utility values generally derived*   
Relatively few questions need be asked   
Weighting function internal to model   
Less susceptible to starting-point bias   
*We recognize that it is possible to derive individual-level valuations within a DCE by asking 
respondents to answer a large number of questions-but that is not what DCEs typically do.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 An example of a DCE pair-wise comparison 
 
.  
 
Treatment A   Treatment B  
 
   
10 in 100 (10%) chance of pink state   99 in 100 (99%) chance of pink state  
 No problems walking about    No problems walking about   
 No problems with self-care    No problems with self-care  
 No problems with performing usual activities    No problems with performing usual activities  
 No pain or discomfort    No pain or discomfort  
 Not anxious or depressed    Not anxious or depressed  
And   and  
90 in 100 (90%) chance of yellow state   1 in 100 (1%) chance of death  
 Some problems walking about     
 No problems with self-care     
 No problems with performing usual activities     
 Moderate pain or discomfort     
 Not anxious or depressed     
 
 
    
Choose to have   Both options are equally preferred   Choose to have 
 
	
Figure 2 Modified SG question 
 
Treatment A   Treatment B  
	
	 	 	 	
10 in 100 (10%) chance of pink state 	 	 chance of pink state 	
 No problems walking about 	 	  No problems walking about 	
 No problems with self-care 	 	  No problems with self-care 	
 No problems with performing usual activities 	 	  No problems with performing usual activities 	
 No pain or discomfort 	 	  No pain or discomfort 	
 Not anxious or depressed 	 	  Not anxious or depressed 	
and 	 	 and 	
90 in 100 (90%) chance of green state 	 	 chance of death 	
 Some problems walking about 	 	  	
 Some problems washing and dressing self 	 	  	
 Some problems with performing usual activities 	 	  	
 Moderate pain or discomfort 	 	  	
 Moderately anxious or depressed 	 	  	
	
	 	 chance of death 	
	 	  
Both options are equally preferred  
	
 
Figure 3: the probability weighting function 
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Appendix: Modelling the DCE Choices  
For this section, we introduce more formal notation. Let Xj denote health-state j.  The 
models developed in this section make the standard, simplifying assumption that all 
individuals have the same utility value for a given health state.  Recall that we are 
commencing from the ‘anchors’ of the utilities of normal health (X0) and dead (X4) 
being 1 and 0 respectively.  There are three other health-states, X1, X2 and X3, with 
utilities u1, u2 and u3 respectively.  The notation is provided in Table 4.  The principal 
objective of the modeling is to obtain estimates of u1, u2 and u3 i.e. to estimate utility 
values for health states anchored to normal health and death. 
 
Consider choice problem i of the DCE.  The choice is between two risky treatments 
Ai and Bi, defined as follows: 
 
Ai:  Probability pa,i of health state Xa,i; probability (1- pa,i) of health state X0. 
Bi:  Probability pb,i of health state Xb,i; probability (1- pb,i) of health state X0. 
 
Under the assumption of EU, the individual computes valuations of Ai and Bi as 
follows: 
 
       
       
   
, , , 0
, , , 0
1
1
i a i a i a i
i b i b i b i
i i i
EU A p U X p U X
EU B p U X p U X
EU B EU A
  
  
  
  (1) 
 
Note that the symbol i is used to represent the difference in expected utilities.  Let yi 
denote the decision.  Recall that there are three possible outcomes: prefer A (yi = 1); 
A and B equally preferable (yi = 2); prefer B (yi = 3).  We model this decision using a 
version of the ordered probit model developed by Aitchison and Silvey36 defined as 
follows: 
 
1
2
3
i i i
i i i
i i i
y if
y if
y if
 
  
 
   
     
   
 
 
	 2
where  2~ 0,i N     (2) 
 
The parameter  is known as the “cut-point”, and indicates the distance from perfect 
indifference (i=0) within which “equally preferable” is reported.  i is a normally 
distributed random error term with standard deviation .  As explained in the main 
text, we also consider a generalization of model (2) which allows sigma to take on a 
different value between three task types.  
 
From (2), the probabilities of the three outcomes are derived as follows: 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3 1
i
i
i i
i
i
i
P y
P y
P y


 
 


       
                 
       
  (3) 
 
where (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  From (3), the log-
likelihood is constructed as follows: 
 
   
 
1 ln 2 ln
3 ln 1
i i i
i i
i i
i
I y I y
LogL
I y
  
  


                                               
   (4) 
The log-likelihood function (3) is programmed using the ML routine in STATA. The 
code is available from the authors on request.  The parameters that are estimated are 
the utilities of the three health states other than normal health and death, i.e. u1, u2 and 
u3, and also  and . 
 
As mentioned previously, we also consider a non-EU theory, in the form of RDU, 
which allows for non-linear weighting of probabilities.  Here, we assume the 
straightforward power weighting function.  If r  is the probability of the good outcome 
(i.e. normal health in this case), then r is transformed according to: 
	 3
 
 r r     (5) 
 
Note that the power weighting function (5) implies that the probability of the good 
outcome, when strictly between 0 and 1, is either always over-weighted (if <1) or 
always underweighted (if >1).  Applying the weighting function (5), we derive the 
valuations of the two treatments:	
 
         
         
   
, , , 0
, , , 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
i a i a i a i
i b i b i b i
RD
i i i
V A p U X p U X
V B p U X p U X
V B V A
 
 
      
      
  
     (6) 
 
RD
i  is then used in place of i in the log-likelihood function (4), and of course there 
will be one additional parameter, , to be estimated. 
